
APPENDIX A (Not intended for publication)

Figure A.1: Fliers for the Treatment and Control Groups

Flier for the Treatment group:



Flier for the Control group:




Figure A.2: Geographic location of the districts in the survey




Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics, Districts sampled

Region		Lima	Lima	Lima	Lima	Lima	Lima	Lima	Lima	Lima	Lima
Province		Lima	Cañete	Huaura	Cañete	Huarochiri	Huaura	Yauyos	Cajatambo	Cajatambo	Huaura
District		Punta Hermosa	Imperial	Santa Maria	San Antonio	San Antonio	Leoncio Prado	Huantan	Huancapon	Cajatambo	Checras
Poverty											
Poverty Ranking		173	176	191	201	841	876	938	978	1042	1047
Poverty Category		Non-poor	Non-poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Poor	Ext. Poor	Ext. Poor	Ext. Poor
Number of HHs		1767	8170	6429	897		717	311	461	791	593
Sampled HHs		251	248	240	241	240	146	93	166	166	121
Sampled Individuals		632	930	756	776	668	418	264	460	462	308
Electoral variables											
Registered voters	2006-1	4,291	24,668	17,577	2,200	5,564	872	543	724	1,857	490
	2006-2	4,291	24,668	17,577	2,200	5,564	872	543	724	1,857	490
	2006-3	4,297	25,006	18,183	2,255	6,478	1,017	568	778	1,891	550
	2010	4,615	26,873	20,630	2,525	13,640	1,367	683	921	1,820	664
Turnout	2006-1	88.9%	92.6%	92.1%	95.0%	93.9%	91.2%	86.0%	77.1%	73.6%	86.5%
	2006-2	88.4%	92.2%	91.4%	94.8%	93.7%	90.5%	88.0%	79.0%	78.3%	85.5%
	2006-3	87.5%	91.1%	90.1%	94.5%	92.5%	91.6%	83.1%	82.5%	75.4%	88.7%
	2010	86.7%	90.0%	88.2%	93.7%	89.9%	91.4%	82.0%	83.6%	79.0%	85.4%
Blank Votes (%)											
	2006-3	3.1%	9.1%	7.0%	8.4%	11.5%	5.5%	8.9%	8.9%	13.9%	12.3%
	2010	3.5%	7.4%	9.3%	6.8%	14.3%	11.6%	10.2%	9.0%	15.5%	4.6%
Invalid Votes (%)											
	2006-3	3.8%	3.7%	9.8%	13.2%	9.2%	2.5%	4.9%	34.3%	5.4%	2.0%
	2010	2.6%	5.7%	5.4%	12.3%	8.0%	0.7%	4.5%	4.3%	4.4%	39.3%
Num. of candidates running	2006	10	11	13	7	8	9	8	6	7	9
for the local government	2010	5	13	20	5	12	2	7	6	6	6

Notes: 2006-1 and 2006-2 refers to the first and second round of the presidential elections held in April and June 2006, respectively. 2006-3 refers to the municipal elections held in November, 2006, the first elections under the law that reduced the fines. Information on the number of households comes from the national census, while that on turnout, invalid votes and political competition comes from the ONPE (electoral office).

Table A.2: Balance Between Attrited and non-Attrited

	Attritters			Non-Attritters			NA - A	P-value
Variable	**Obs.**	**Std. Dev.**	**Mean**	**Obs.**	**Std. Dev.**	**Mean**		
Perceived Fine (Baseline)	481	125.99	56.68	1733	124.00	54.53	-1.99	(0.48)
Gender (Male=1)	481	0.49	0.50	1733	0.40	0.49	-0.09	(0.00)
Age	481	39.14	14.00	1733	38.67	13.14	-0.47	(0.49)
Yrs. of education	481	9.65	3.89	1733	10.02	3.93	0.37	(0.07)
Log(PC Expenditures)	481	5.29	1.04	1733	5.35	0.81	0.06	(0.21)
Center	476	0.68	0.47	1666	0.70	0.46	0.02	(0.41)
Left	476	0.08	0.26	1666	0.08	0.27	0.00	(0.90)
Right	476	0.24	0.43	1666	0.22	0.41	-0.02	(0.32)
Very Interested in politics	472	0.06	0.24	1714	0.07	0.26	0.01	(0.44)
Interested in politics	472	0.46	0.50	1714	0.46	0.50	0.01	(0.78)
Not Interested in politics	472	0.48	0.50	1714	0.46	0.50	-0.02	(0.50)
Very Interested in the results of this election	481	0.35	0.48	1733	0.38	0.49	0.03	(0.20)
Interested in the results of this election	475	0.48	0.50	1718	0.46	0.50	-0.02	(0.47)
Not Interested in the results of this election	481	0.17	0.38	1733	0.16	0.37	-0.01	(0.55)
Very Interested in the campaign of this election	476	0.11	0.31	1715	0.09	0.29	-0.01	(0.37)
Interested in the campaign of this election	476	0.50	0.50	1715	0.55	0.50	0.05	(0.04)
Not Interested in the campaign of this election	476	0.39	0.49	1715	0.35	0.48	-0.04	(0.10)
Name recall- Candidates running	480	0.39	0.36	1733	0.36	0.36	-0.03	(0.15)
Name recall- Parties running	480	0.29	0.33	1733	0.29	0.32	-0.01	(0.70)
Name recall- Candidates+Parties running	480	0.34	0.33	1733	0.32	0.32	-0.02	(0.32)
Political information score	481	0.56	0.17	1733	0.55	0.17	-0.00	(0.83)

Notes: The table includes all subjects interviewed in the baseline survey, i.e.. voters registered in poor or non-poor districts. The table does not show the balance for the policy preference variables, since the pricipal component is computed only among those who enter the analysis (non-Attritters). The F-test for joint significance for the full sample shows a p-value of 0.02, however, when we exclude the variable gender from the test, we are able to reject signifficant differences in attrition, with a p-value of 0.33.

Table A.3: Balance Between Respondents who showed and did not show their ID

Variable	**Full Analysis Sample**			
	Obs.	**Show ID**	**Not Show ID**	**Diff. p-val**
Perceived Fine (Baseline)	1732	125.00	122.13	(0.30)
Gender (Male=1)	1732	0.40	0.41	(0.89)
Age	1732	38.58	38.80	(0.74)
Yrs. of education	1732	9.97	10.12	(0.45)
PC Expenditures	1732	271.58	319.05	(0.01)
Center	1665	0.72	0.68	(0.07)
Left	1665	0.08	0.07	(0.20)
Right	1665	0.20	0.26	(0.00)
Very Interested in politics	1713	0.07	0.07	(0.58)
Interested in politics	1713	0.47	0.46	(0.66)
Not Interested in politics	1713	0.46	0.47	(0.47)
Very Interested in the results of this election	1732	0.38	0.38	(0.97)
Interested in the results of this election	1717	0.46	0.46	(0.89)
Not Interested in the results of this election	1732	0.16	0.16	(0.90)
Very Interested in the campaign of this election	1714	0.09	0.09	(0.52)
Interested in the campaign of this election	1714	0.56	0.55	(0.77)
Not Interested in the campaign of this election	1714	0.35	0.37	(0.49)
Name recall- Candidates running	1732	0.37	0.34	(0.05)
Name recall- Parties running	1732	0.30	0.28	(0.22)
Name recall- Candidates+Parties running	1732	0.33	0.31	(0.09)
Political information score	1732	0.55	0.56	(0.68)

Notes: The table includes all subjects interviewed in the baseline survey and follow up survey who are considered in the analysis sample, i.e.. voters registered in poor or non-poor districts and have information for all the relevant covariates.

Table A.4: Robustness checks

	Panel A: Including Voters from Ext. Poor Districts		
	Reduced Form	First Stage	IV
		Dependent Variable:	
	Voted in 2010	Perceived Fine (FollowUp)	Voted in 2010
△ Perceived Fine			0.0016
			(0.0005)***
Treatment: Fine S/.72	-.0208	-17.4542	
	(0.0157)	(4.8582)***	
Treatment: Fine S/.36	-.0508	-28.5876	
	(0.0161)***	(4.6360)***	
Treatment: Fine S/.18	-.0091	-7.7912	
	(0.0201)	(5.8322)	
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Village FE	Y	Y	Y
Mean dep. var.	0.9424	-65.17	0.9424
F-statistic			17.4649
Obs.	2273	2273	2273
	Panel B: Potential Violation of Monotonicity		
	Reduced Form	First Stage	IV
		Dependent Variable:	
	Voted in 2010	Perceived Fine (FollowUp)	Voted in 2010
△ Perceived Fine			0.0014
			(0.0005)***
Treatment: Fine S/.72	-.0240	-20.0418	
	(0.016)	(4.6314)***	
Treatment: Fine S/.36	-.0434	-28.4220	
	(0.0169)**	(4.2909)***	
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Village FE	Y	Y	Y
Mean dep. var.	0.945	-69.66	0.945
F-statistic			31.27
Obs.	1540	1540	1540

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. In Panel A, Column (1) presents a linear probability model, while in Column (2) I use OLS, and in Column (3) I present a 2SLS regression where Δ Perceived Fine is instrumented by the three treatment dummies (Treat*NonPoor, Treat*Poor and Treat*ExtremePoor). Regression equations are specified in equations (1), (2) and (3), but include a dummy for being registered to vote in an extremely poor district. In Panel B, we consider the analysis sample, but exclude all voters from poor and non-poor municipalities whose baseline perceived fine was below the actual fine (192 voters, who correspond to 11% of the analysis sample, i.e. the sample in which we might find *defiers*.) All regressions include controls for gender, age, years of education, log(PC Expenditures), and a dummy for being registered to vote in a poor district.

Table A.5: Coefficients for Policy Preference First Principal Component

Policy issues	Coefficients
Health: infrastructure	-0.109
Health: personnel and services	-0.146
Education: infrastructure	-0.123
Education: teachers and services	-0.081
Transport: Ordering transit	0.042
Transport: Infrastructure (roads, access, etc.)	-0.358
Basic services: Water, electricity, sewage, communications	-0.452
Promote tourism	-0.055
Economics: Support micro and small enterprises	-0.025
Economics: Training to local enetrepeneurs	-0.028
Economics: Agriculture - technical assistance, and training to local producers	-0.274
Economics: Agriculture - infrastructure projects for agriculture	-0.111
Economics: promote private investment	-0.029
Youth: Sport activities and infrastructure	-0.037
Youth: Labor training programs	0.018
Women: empowerment and programs	0.003
Social: More participation, participatory budgets	-0.024
Security: More policemen	0.153
Security: Fight gangs and drugs in the streets	0.225
Environment: Cleaning the district Garbage trucks	0.045
Environment: More green areas	-0.066
Environment: Recycling of solid residues	0.001
Institutional: Transparency in procedures	-0.025
Institutional: Modernize procedures	-0.030
Infrastructure: Markets, public buildings	-0.052
Social: Children and elderly programs, school lunches, etc.	-0.028
Social: work for the poor	-0.017
Housing: land and house titling	-0.035

Table A.6: Main Regressions with Additional controls

	Reduced Form	First Stage	2SLS
		Dependent Variable:	
	Voted in the 2010 Election	△ Perceived Fine	Voted in the 2010 Election
△ Perceived Fine			0.001 (0.0005)***
Treatment: Fine S/.72	-.025 (0.015)*	-19.328 (4.919)***	
Treatment: Fine S/.36	-.045 (0.016)***	-29.145 (4.750)***	
Gender (Male=1)	0.016 (0.011)	-2.455 (3.470)	0.019 (0.012)
Age	0.001 (0.0004)**	0.347 (0.138)**	0.0005 (0.0005)
Yrs. of education	0.003 (0.002)	-.144 (0.511)	0.003 (0.002)
Log(PC Expenditures)	0.009 (0.008)	-1.816 (2.634)	0.011 (0.009)
Left	-.011 (0.023)	8.549 (6.770)	-.023 (0.025)
Right	-.011 (0.013)	-4.561 (4.327)	-.004 (0.015)
Interested in politics	0.029 (0.022)	3.992 (6.740)	0.023 (0.025)
Not Interested in politics	0.038 (0.023)*	1.279 (6.929)	0.036 (0.025)
Name recall-Candidates	0.097 (0.028)***	4.263 (6.621)	0.091 (0.029)***
Votes in Poor district	-.020 (0.022)	-2.491 (6.463)	-.019 (0.022)
Controls	Y	Y	Y
Village FE	Y	Y	Y
Mean Dep. Var.	0.949	-57.552	0.949
First Stage F-Stat			26.429
Obs.	1650	1650	1650

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. Panel A presents linear probability models, while in Panel B we use OLS. Regression equations are specified in equations (1) and (2).

Table A.7: IV - Effect of Change in Perceived Fines, Alternatives measures of fines

	Dep. Var: Voted in the 2010 Election				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
△ Perceived Fine	0.0017				
	(0.0005)***				
P. Fine (Follow-up)		0.0016			
		(0.0005)***			
Log(1+P. Fine (Follow-up))			0.1426		
			(0.0416)***		
△ P. Fine/PC Exp.				1.0764	
				(0.3809)***	
P. Fine (Follow-up)/PC Exp.					1.3742
					(0.4191)***
P. Fine (Follow-up)		-.00008			
		(0.0001)			
Log(1+P. Fine (Baseline))			0.001		
			(0.0094)		
P. Fine (Baseline)/PC Exp.					-0.3193
					(0.0878)***
Gender (Male=1)	0.0184	0.0112	0.0111	0.0143	0.0054
	(0.0126)	(0.0115)	(0.0118)	(0.0132)	(0.0125)
Age	0.0007	0.0013	0.0013	0.0011	0.0009
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)***	(0.0005)***	(0.0005)**	(0.0005)*
Yrs. of education	0.0039	0.0042	0.0041	0.0036	0.0043
	(0.002)*	(0.0019)**	(0.0019)**	(0.0022)*	(0.0021)**
Log(PC Expenditures)	0.0108	0.0087	0.0077	-.0505	0.0422
	(0.0089)	(0.0083)	(0.0084)	(0.0224)**	(0.0186)**
Votes in Poor district	-.0038	0.0054	0.023	-.0016	0.0121
	(0.0219)	(0.0207)	(0.0225)	(0.0216)	(0.0219)
Village FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean dep. var.	0.952	0.946	0.949		
Obs.	1732	1732	1732	1714	1721
F-Stat	25.6271	68.5704	48.8389	13.4935	27.921

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. All columns present 2SLS estimations where the independent variable of interest is instrumented by the two treatment dummies (Treatment: Fine S/.72 and Treatment: Fine S/.36, from Table **??**). Columns (4) and (5) exclude outliers (indepepndent variable is lower than -2 or greater than 2.) The regression equation is specified in equation (3).