Gianmarco León-Ciliotta

My research focuses on development, organizational, and political economics. My Google Scholar profile is available here.

Selected Published and Forthcoming Papers

Papers are copyrighted by the respective publisher. A single copy may be downloaded for personal research and study only.

Accepted at Journal of Political Economy.
Abstract

We exploit data on centralized teacher recruitment in Perú to establish that wage rigidity creates large urban-rural disparities in teacher effectiveness. Leveraging a teacher compensation reform, we provide causal evidence that increasing salaries in less desirable locations attracts qualified teachers and improves student learning. We estimate a model of teacher sorting and student achievement featuring rich heterogeneity in teachers’ preferences and effectiveness. Substantial equity and efficiency gains arise from reallocating existing teachers to exploit match effects or attracting applicants with higher average effectiveness into public teaching. Counterfactual wage schedules achieving these gains suggest that the latter is more cost-effective.

Media: VoxDev; BSE Focus
The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 107(7). November 2025.
Abstract

We study the effect of raising the level and transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up and usage, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives have no effect on take-up and usage, despite greater agent effort. This is due to the financial incentives sending a negative signal to potential clients about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product. Hence, when designing incentives, organizations should consider both their level and transparency.

with Stefano Caria, Erika Deserranno, and Philipp Kastrau
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 133(8): 2506–2562. August 2025.
Abstract

Does the allocation of incentives across the hierarchy of an organization matter for its performance? In an experiment with a large public health organization, we find that health care provision is highly affected by how incentives are allocated between frontline workers and their supervisors. Sharing incentives equally between these two layers raises health visits by 61% compared with unilateral allocations and uniquely improves health service provision and health outcomes. We provide reduced-form and structural evidence that effort complementarities and contractual frictions drive these results and explore the implications for the optimal design of incentive policies in multilayered organizations.

Media: J-PAL Blog; VoxDev
with Erika Deserranno and Philipp Kastrau
American Economic Review: Insights, Vol. 7(1): 71–89. March 2025.
Abstract

We study promotion incentives in the public sector. In collaboration with Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Health, we introduce exogenous variation in the meritocratic nature of promotions from health worker to supervisor positions and in health workers’ perceptions of pay progression upon promotion. Ten months later, our findings reveal that meritocracy leads to a 22 percent increase in health workers’ productivity. Greater perceived pay progression in a meritocratic system boosts productivity by 23 percent, whereas in a less meritocratic system, it decreases productivity by 27 percent. We show that this reduction is consistent with a negative morale effect.

Media: J-PAL Blog; VoxDev
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 17(1): 181–215. February 2025.
Abstract

We study a large-scale family planning intervention in which more than 260,000 Peruvian women were sterilized. Many of these medical procedures are alleged to have been performed without patient consent. The subsequent disclosure of alleged illegal sterilizations caused reductions in the usage of contraceptive methods and prenatal and birth delivery services and, more generally, the demand for medical services in affected areas. As a result, child health worsened. The results persist for at least 17 years after the information disclosure and are driven by disappointed supporters of the implementing government. Learning about the government’s malpractices undermined trust in institutions.

World Development, Vol. 174: 106437. February 2024.
Abstract

Venezuela is currently experiencing the biggest crisis in its recent history. This has led more than 7.3 million Venezuelans to emigrate, at least 1.5 million of those to Peru, which amounted to an increase of over 4 percent in the Peruvian population. Venezuelan immigrants in Peru are relatively similar in cultural terms, but, on average, more skilled than Peruvians. In this paper, we first examine Venezuelans’ perceptions of being discriminated against in Peru. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we document a causal relationship between the level of employment in the informal sector – where most immigrants are employed – and reports of discrimination. We then study the impact of Venezuelan migration on local’s labor market outcomes, reported crime rates, and attitudes using a variety of data sources. We find that inflows of Venezuelans to particular locations led to increased employment and income among locals, decreased reported crime, and improved reported community quality. We conduct a heterogeneity analysis to identify the mechanisms behind these labor market effects and discuss the implications for Peruvian immigration policy.

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 14(1): 293–326. January 2022.
Abstract

We study voters’ response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru, leveraging variation from a nationwide reform. A smaller fine has a robust, negative effect on voter turnout, partly through irregular changes in voter registration. However, representation is largely unaffected, as most of the lost votes are blank or invalid. We also show that the effect of an exemption from compulsory voting is substantially larger than that of a full fine reduction, suggesting that nonmonetary incentives are the main drivers behind the effectiveness of compulsory voting.

with Miriam Artiles and Lukas Kleine-Rueschkamp
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 103(2): 397–411. May 2021.
Abstract

We estimate the effects of political accountability on the selection of politicians when accountability mechanisms are prone to political capture. We compare the characteristics of candidates running in municipalities where the previous incumbent was ousted from office through a recall referendum with those who run where the recall referendum failed by a small margin. Having a recalled incumbent in the previous term causes a negative selection of candidates in terms of their education and previous experience. They are also less representative of indigenous groups. The results are driven by localities where the accountability institution is likely used for political purposes.

Media: VoxDev
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 128(9): 3570–3625. September 2020.
Abstract

We study the relationship between firms’ output quality and organizational structure. Using data on the production and transaction chain that makes up Peruvian fish meal manufacturing, we establish three results. First, firms integrate suppliers when the quality premium rises for exogenous reasons. Second, suppliers change their behavior to better maintain input quality when vertically integrated. Third, firms produce a higher share of high-quality output when weather and supplier availability shocks shift them into using integrated suppliers. Overall, our results indicate that quality upgrading is an important motive for integrating suppliers facing a quantity-quality trade-off, as classical theories of the firm predict.

Winner of the Oliver Williamson Award for Best Paper at the Society of Institutional and Organizational Economics annual conference.
Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 17(3): 876–916. June 2019.
Abstract

Industrial regulations are typically designed with a particular policy objective and set of firms in mind. When input–output linkages connect firms across sectors, such piecemeal regulations may worsen externalities elsewhere in the economy. Using daily administrative and survey data, we show that in Peru’s industrial fishing sector, the world’s largest, air pollution from downstream (fishmeal) manufacturing plants caused 55,000 additional respiratory hospital admissions per year as a consequence of the introduction of individual property rights (over fish) upstream. The upstream regulatory change removed suppliers’ incentive to “race” for the resource and enabled market share to move from inefficient to efficient downstream firms. As a result, the reform spread downstream production out across time, as predicted by a conceptual framework of vertically connected sectors. We show evidence consistent with the hypothesis that longer periods of moderate air polluting production can be worse for health than concentrating a similar amount of production in shorter periods. Our findings demonstrate the risks of piecemeal regulatory design in interlinked economies.

Media: BSE Focus
with Alberto Chong, Martin Valdivia, Vivian Roza, and Gabriela Vega
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 63(2): 323–341. April 2019.
Abstract

We use a field experiment to evaluate the impact of two informational get‐out‐the‐vote campaigns to boost female electoral participation in rural areas of Paraguay. We find that public rallies had a small and insignificant effect either on registration or voter turnout in the 2013 presidential elections. Households that received door‐to‐door canvassing treatment were 4.6 percentage points more likely to vote. Experimental variation on the intensity of the treatment at the locality level allows us to estimate spillover effects, which are present in localities that are geographically more concentrated, which may favor social interactions and diffusion of information. Reinforcement effects on the already treated population are twice as large as diffusion effects on the untreated. Our results underscore the importance of taking into account urbanization patterns when designing informational campaigns.

Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 127: 56–71. July 2017.
Abstract

I combine a field experiment with a change in voting laws reducing the fine for abstention to assess the effects of monetary incentives to encourage voter participation. In a real world election, using experimental variation in the perceived reduction of the fine for abstention I estimate that receiving information about a reduction in the fine by 50 (75) percent causes a decrease in turnout of 2.6 (5.3) percentage points. These estimates imply a cost elasticity of voting of −0.22. The reduction in turnout is driven by voters who are in the center of the political spectrum, hold less political information and have lower subjective value of voting. The increase in abstention does not change aggregate preferences for specific policies. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire political information, is independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that the reduction in the fine reduces the incidence of vote buying and increases the price paid for a vote.

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 145: 103–115. January 2017.
Abstract

We study a unique quasi-experiment in Austria, where compulsory voting laws are changed across Austria's nine states at different times. Analyzing state and national elections from 1949 to 2010, we show that compulsory voting laws with weakly enforced fines increase turnout by roughly 10 percentage points. However, we find no evidence that this change in turnout affected government spending patterns (in levels or composition) or electoral outcomes. Individual-level data on turnout and political preferences suggest that these results occur because the impacts of compulsory voting on turnout are larger among those who are non-partisan, who have low interest in politics, and who are uninformed.

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 9(1): 202–228. January 2017.
Abstract

This paper exploits an unusual transportation setting to generate some of the first revealed preference value of a statistical life (VSL) estimates from a low-income setting. We estimate the trade-offs individuals are willing to make between mortality risk and cost as they travel to and from the international airport in Sierra Leone. The setting and original dataset allow us to address some typical omitted variable concerns, and also to compare VSL estimates for travelers from different countries, all facing the same choice situation. The average VSL estimate for African travelers in the sample is US$577,000 compared to US$924,000 for non-Africans.

with Martin Valdivia
International Journal of Educational Development, Vol. 40(1): 71–84. Winter 2015.
Abstract

This paper goes further in the discussion on the determinants of school attainment in developing countries. To properly estimate the effects of school resources on academic achievement, we need to take into account the large geographical inequalities in the distribution of school resources and the supply constraints faced by students living in poor areas. We do so by implementing a two-step correction that accounts for the constraints in school choice. Our findings suggest that failing to account for these constraints leads to an underestimation of the effect of school resources on school achievement of about 100%. This underestimation is particularly important for girls and in Math. Additionally, the contribution of school resources in explaining the gap in test scores between rich and poor students is doubled once we account for the constrained choices.

Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 47(4): 991–1023. Fall 2012.
Abstract

This paper provides empirical evidence of the persistent effect of exposure to political violence on human capital accumulation. I exploit the variation in conflict location and birth cohorts to identify the longand short-term effects of the civil war on educational attainment. Conditional on being exposed to violence, the average person accumulates 0.31 less years of education as an adult. In the short-term, the effects are stronger than in the long-run; these results hold when comparing children within the same household. Further, exposure to violence during early childhood leads to permanent losses. I also explore the potential causal mechanisms.

Book Chapters

In: Rodden & Wibbles, eds. Decentralized Governance and Accountability. 2019.

Pre-Doctoral Publications

Privatized Firms, Rule of Law, and Labor Outcomes in Emerging Markets
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45(9): 1513–1525. October 2009.
Barriers to Exit
Economics Letters, Vol. 99: 93–97. April 2008.
International Remittances and Income Inequality: An Empirical Investigation
with Valerie Koechlin
Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 10(2): 123–141. June 2007.
with Alberto Chong and Cecilia de Mendoza
In: Chong, ed. Development Connections: Unveiling the Impact of New Information Technologies. Palgrave McMillan, 2011.
with Alberto Chong and Hugo Ñopo
In: Marquez et al., eds. Outsiders? The Changing Patterns of Exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean. IDB–Harvard University Press, 2008.